We study models where two sellers simultaneously decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a …nite, not necessarily large, number of buyers who have unit demand and privately known valuations. In the …rst model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second model, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers decide where to bid. Our results shed some light on the conditions leading to either the emergence of dominant marketplaces or to the coexistence of several competing sites. Using the theory of potential games, we show that in the one auction site model there is always an (almost symmetric) equilibrium in pure strategies. This equilibrium approximates the Cournot outcome as the number of buyers becomes large. In contrast, if the distribution of buyers values has an increasing failure rate, and if the marginal cost of production is relatively low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium where both sellers make positive pro…ts in the competing sites model. We also identify conditions under which an equilibrium with a unique active site exists. Technically, we are able to deal with the …nite and discrete models by using several results about order statistics developed by Richard Barlow and Frank Proschan (1965 , 1966 .
Introduction
We study models where two sellers simultaneously decide on their (discrete) supply of a homogenous good, and where there is a …nite, not necessarily large, number of buyers who have unit demand and privately known valuations. 1 In the …rst model, the sellers bring their supply to a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. Thus, by the intrinsic rules of the mechanism, all sold units command the same price. In the second model, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller.
Before observing their value, but after observing the respective supplied quantities at each site, buyers decide which auction to attend (again, each auction is a uniform price one). In principle, each auction may have its own equilibrium price.
Our results shed some light on the conditions leading to either the emergence of one dominant marketplace or the coexistence of several competing sites. In the one auction site model there is always an (almost symmetric) equilibrium in pure strategies. This equilibrium approximates the Cournot outcome as the number of buyers becomes large. In contrast, if the distribution of buyers values has an increasing failure rate (a condition assumed in most of the literature, which implies that marginal revenue is decreasing), and if the marginal cost of production is relatively low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium where both sellers make positive pro…ts in the competing sites model. In other words, two distinct auction sites cannot coexist in equilibrium under these conditions. Coexistence becomes possible only if the marginal cost of production is su¢ ciently high. We also identify conditions under which an equilibrium with a unique active site exists.
Another goal of this paper is to revisit several classical scenarios in monopoly and oligopoly theory.
These theories discard the standard assumption of competitive analysis concerning the large number of producing …rms (sellers), but they keep the assumption that the number of consumers (buyers) is large. Our model has both a small number of sellers with endogenous supply, and a small number of buyers. 2 This framework is appealing in many situations, in particular in markets for inputs where both upstream and downstream markets are relatively concentrated oligopolies. Technically, we are able to deal with the …nite and discrete models by using several results about order statistics developed by Richard Barlow and Frank Proschan (1965 , 1966 ). 3 One way to unify the two main models of the paper is in terms of buyers' switching cost. If the switching cost is high, that is, once buyers decide to place a bid in one auction they cannot switch to the other, we obtain the model with two competing auction sites. If the switching cost is low, then an ascending clock auction a la Demange-Gale-Sotomayor (this is a variant with money on Gale-Shapley's 1 Most qualitative results can be generalized to settings with more sellers. 2 The parallels between a single-good auction theory and monopoly are well-known -see Bulow and Roberts (1989) . Hansen (1988) studies a model where sellers compete for the right to become the sole supplier to a unique buyer whose purchase depends on the winning bid. 3 For other applications of Barlow Viewed in this perspective, the competing auctions model is one where, in the …rst (quantity-setting) stage, the sellers compete for market share, i.e., for the buyers that will become locked-in at the second stage (see Klemperer, 1987 for an early analysis of the forces at play in such models). By increasing quantity, a seller attracts more buyers.
"Lock-ins" appear in many settings and have a variety of reasons such as transaction costs associated with operating via several technologically di¤erent platforms/clearing houses, uncertainty about the quality/quantity o¤ered at other marketplaces, "loyalty" contracts with operators, ex-ante market speci…c investments, and various forms of network externalities.
On the other hand, a model with a centralized auction site and with endogenous supply is better suited for the study of some modern markets where all transactions are executed at market price, i.e., order driven periodic auctions in …nancial markets, or markets for inputs such as electricity or gas. 4 At online auction sites such as eBay there are often several simultaneous auctions for identical commodities (e.g., CPU's). Sajid et al. (2004) empirically study such parallel auctions and …nd that a signi…cant proportion of bidders are indeed active across the competing auctions: they repeatedly place bids in the auctions with the lowest standing bid. Moreover, prices tended to be uniform across auctions.
In contrast to our paper, most of the papers in the relatively thin literature on competing auctions consider models with several sellers endowed with a single unit of a homogenous good, and with several buyers with unit demand who decide which auction to attend. Thus, total demand and supply are …xed exogenously, whereas total supply is endogenous in our models. Moreover, most of these papers use some kind of "large market assumption" for their main results (i.e., individual agents ignore the e¤ect of their own actions on prices) while such an assumption is not needed here. It is not always clear whether such assumptions are consistent with a limit obtained in small markets of increased size. Peters and Severinov (2006) consider several sellers who set reserve prices at their own auctions sites and then conduct second price auctions. A large number of buyers with unit demand can move among auction sites. The main consequence of this freedom (i.e., absence of switching costs) is that there exists an e¢ cient equilibrium (conditional on reserve prices). This is consistent with the insight obtained from the models that mimic features of the where the seller adjusts supply after seeing the realization of demand, and where bidders demand several units. LiCalzi and Pavan (2006) allow the monopolist to ex-ante commit to a supply function. This is in the spirit of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) who study supply-function equilibria in oligopoly with demand uncertainty. 5 He considers several sellers o¤ering auctions at …xed sites (each seller at another site). His analysis assumes that the leading to an ine¢ ciency stemming from the coordination problem.
The role of a unique marketplace is also the theme of Moreno and Ubeda (2006) who introduce an explicit element of price formation in the traditional Cournot oligopoly story (while keeping the assumption that there is a large number of buyers). Their starting point is the classical paper by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) who study a two stage game, with capacity choice in the …rst stage, and
Bertrand competition in the second stage. Kreps If we introduce reserve prices in our model of competing sellers at one auction site, and if we let the number of buyers go to in…nity (which is the standard assumption in the literature) it can be shown that, if quantity is optimally adjusted to the number of buyers, the marginal gain from a reserve price goes to zero. 7 The limit outcome is then the classical Cournot one -corresponding to the main result of Moreno and Ubeda (2006) .
An interesting strand that allows for both a small number of buyers and a small number of sellers is the literature on the so-called strategic market games, following the pioneering work by Shapley and Shubik (1975) . In these models both buyers and sellers bid quantities, and transactions are cleared at a price equal to the ratio of demand to supply (thus, commodities are allocated in proportion to bids). Almost the entire literature identi…es the number of trading sites (or "posts") with the number of traded commodities. In other words, there is a unique trading site for each traded commodity where all demand and supply of that commodity is cleared. A notable exception is Koutsougeras (2003) who allows for two separate trading sites for the same good. In his model traders can send quantity bids to either one, or to both sites. He shows via an example that the "Law of One Price" need not hold in equilibrium. Although di¤erent trading prices open up arbitrage opportunities for agents who can shift their demand/supply (which seems inconsistent with the equilibrium idea), these opportunities economy is large, and therefore it ignores the e¤ects of individual buyers on prices. In particular, it ignores the fact that a change in one seller's mechanism a¤ects the distribution of buyers at his own and at other sites. 6 The K-S result critically depends on a particular rationing rule used when capacity is binding. Davidson and Deneckere (1986) show that the Cournot outcome cannot be the equilibrium of the two stage game for any other rationing rule.
Moreover, for a wide range of capacity choices, the equilibrium at the price competition stage is in mixed strategies, leading to ex-post regret. 7 This result is based on an analogous observation for a monopolistic …rm that optimally adjusts quantity in response to a varying number of buyers. Since an increase (decrease) in quantity causes a decrease (increase) in price, a binding reserve price becomes super ‡uous as an instrument to control price. This should be contrasted to what happens if competing sellers have only one unit to sell (Burguet and Sakovics, 1999) disappear when individual agents (who have, relatively speaking, a "large" impact if the number of traders is small) try to take advantage of them. Such phenomena, which also appear in our model, nicely illustrate the caution that needs to be employed when dealing with models with a small number of traders. In particular, market structure may matter a lot: in our model, even mere equilibrium existence is a¤ected by it.
Our model of competing auction sites with two possibly distinct prices is related to that of Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius (2004) . These authors study a situation where both sellers and buyers (each with unit demand/supply) simultaneously choose one of two auction sites. 8 Thus, both buyers and sellers are locked-in at their respective sites, and both total supply and demand in the market are …xed.
Prices are determined by uniform-price auctions at each site (and thus by the ratio of buyers to sellers at each location). 9 Their elegant analysis ignores the integer constraints, and some results hold only for markets with large numbers of traders. 10 The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model ingredients and introduce useful de…nitions and notation. In Section 3 we study the case of one auction site. In Subsection 3.1 we start with a monopolistic seller using a uniform price auction. We focus on the optimal supplied quantity, and we show that it increases in the convexity of the distribution function of buyers'
valuations. This allows us to derive optimal quantity estimates for large, non-parametric families of distributions (i.e., with monotone hazard rates, concave, convex) . In subsection 3.2 we remain in the single auction-site model, but add competition among sellers: each of two ex-ante symmetric sellers provides the auctioneer with several units of a homogenous good, and the auctioneer sells the total quantity via a uniform price auction. With a large number of buyers, this is equivalent to classical Cournot competition. Using the potential game approach (due to Monderer and Shapley, 1996) we 8 This is an application of a more general framework developed by Ellison and Fudenberg (2002) 9 We could have also presented our model by assuming that: 1) every unit is owned by a di¤erent seller; 2) the operator of each auction site restricts entry of sellers in order to maximize total pro…t at the site. prove the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for any constant marginal cost. Moreover, we show that an "almost" symmetric equilibrium, where the supplied quantities di¤er by at most one unit, always exists. Finally, we use the above described estimates in the monopoly case to give estimates for the total quantity under competition. In Subsection 3.3 we o¤er an example illustrating that a merger of auction sites may not be pro…table if sellers optimize supply before and after a merger (although a merger is always e¢ ciency increasing). This contrasts an earlier insight due to Schwartz and Ungo (2002) who considered sellers with exogenously given quantities.
In Section 4 we turn to the model with two distinct auction sites, each with one seller: First, the two sellers simultaneously choose the number of units supplied in their respective auctions. Before they learn their valuations, but after they observe the sellers' decisions, buyers choose which auction to attend. In the last stage, each buyer learns his valuation and submits a bid in his selected auction.
In Subsection 4.1 we study the possibility of coexistence of two auction sites. A main result is that if the marginal production cost is low enough, and if the distribution of buyers'values has an increasing hazard rate then there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which both sellers are active and make positive pro…ts. The reason is that each seller continually increases supply in order to snatch buyers from the other site. A coexistence equilibrium is possible only if the marginal cost of production is high enough.
Then, the unilateral incentives to increase supply are capped by the production cost. In Subsection 4.2
we study equilibria where only one auction site is active (i.e., the other seller prefers to stay out). Such an equilibrium is possible if the optimal monopolistic quantity produced by the active seller is high enough to deter entry -this happens, for example, if the distribution of buyers'values is su¢ ciently convex, and if the marginal cost is not too high.
In Section 5 we compare the equilibrium quantities and prices across three di¤erent models (monopoly, competition at one auction site, and two competing auction sites) under the assumption that there is a large number of buyers. We show that, under a mild condition, the monopoly model has the highest price and lowest quantity in equilibrium. Furthermore, if the equilibrium supply is relatively high (e.g., if the production cost is low and the distribution of buyers'valuations is su¢ ciently convex), the model with two auction sites is more competitive than the model with one auction site: the equilibrium price is lower and the equilibrium quantity is higher in the former model. Finally, if the equilibrium supply is relatively low, then the reverse is true. There are two competing sellers and n 2 buyers. The sellers can each produce several units of a homogenous good. Each buyer has unit demand. The valuation of buyer j for a unit of the good is private information to j: Valuations are drawn independently of each other from the interval [0; T ] ; T 1; according to a distribution function F that is common knowledge.
We consider two di¤erent competition models among the sellers:
1. One auction site: Sellers 1 and 2 simultaneously provide k 1 and k 2 units to the auctioneer, respectively. Then the auctioneer sells the (k 1 + k 2 ) units via a uniform price auction. The revenue of each seller is the product of the equilibrium price and his supplied quantity.
Two competing auction sites:
In the …rst stage, sellers 1 and 2 simultaneously choose the number of objects for sale k i , i = 1; 2; in their own auctions. In the second stage, before they learn their valuations, but after they know the decision made by the sellers in the …rst stage, buyers choose whether to attend auction 1 or 2. In the third and last stage, each buyer learns his valuation and submits a bid in his selected auction (each of the two auctions is a uniform price auction). The revenue of each seller is the product of his supplied quantity and equilibrium price in his own auction.
Notation
We use the following notation: X k;n denotes k-th order statistic out of n independent valuations distributed according to F (note that X n;n is the highest order statistic, and so on..). The distribution F k;n and the density f k;n of X k;n are given by
We denote by EX k;n the expected value of X k;n .
The failure rate (or hazard rate) of a distribution F is de…ned by:
A distribution function F has an increasing failure rate (IF R) if its failure (or hazard) rate, (x) ; is increasing. Analogously, F has an decreasing failure rate (DF R) if (x) is decreasing. Note that convexity of F implies IF R , while DF R implies concavity. The only distribution that is both concave and convex is the uniform, while the only distribution that is both IF R and DF R is the exponential.
3. If G is uniform, then G 1 F convex is equivalent to F is convex.
One Auction Site
We discuss …rst the model of a uniform price multi-object auction with n buyers and a single, monopolist seller with variable supply. The derived insights will be repeatedly used in the analysis of competition among sellers below.
Monopoly seller
The seller decides on the supply k , and then the buyers decide what to bid in an uniform price auction for k units. We do not explicitly analyze here the use of exclusion tools such as reserve prices and entry fees. Thus all n buyers have an incentive to participate in the auction. Note that in an auction with endogenous quantity and large number of buyers, the marginal gain from setting optimal reserve price is small if quantity is optimally set. The intuition is provided by the fact that the realizations of X n k:n are very close to EX n k;n if n is large. The seller can control EX n k;n by varying the quantity k: If the reserve price is binding and enhancing revenue, the seller can always set the quantity to k 0 such that, approximately, EX n k 0 ;n = r: After this adjustment, the reserve price is redundant.
We assume …rst that the seller has a zero cost of producing the object. If the seller o¤ers k > n objects, it is obvious that the equilibrium price is zero, and the seller has zero pro…t. Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to the case k n: In the auction, each of the k highest buyers wins a single unit, and pays the equilibrium price X n k;n . In expectation, the seller's maximization problem is given by
The relation between the optimal number of objects and the distribution of the buyers'valuation is as follows:
Proposition 1 Consider two distributions G; F leading to optimal supplies k G (n) and k F (n) , respectively, when there are n buyers. If G 1 F is star-shaped then k G (n) k F (n):
Proposition 1 implies the following two corollaries:
Corollary 1 If F is IFR (DFR), and n is large, then k F (n); the optimal supply in an auction with n buyers satis…es k F (n) ( ) n e ; where e is the natural logarithm basis.
Corollary 2 If F is convex(concave), then k F (n); the optimal supply in the auction with n buyers satis…es k F (n) ( ) n 2 :
The following result considers the function k F (n) that relates the optimal supply to the number of buyers. It shows that the "slope" of this function is less than unity if F is IF R (thus, the di¤erence n k (n) weakly increases in n)
Proposition 2 Let k F (n) be the optimal number of objects in the auction with n buyers. If F is IF R, then, for all n; k F (n + 1) k F (n) 1:
Remark 1 When n is large we have the approximation EX n k;n F 1 n k n Hence, the seller's revenue in our auction is
Consider now a monopolist seller facing n buyers, each with unit demand and valuation distribution F:
The monopolist chooses p to maximize his expected revenue.
Setting k = n [1 F (p)] ; or equivalently p = F 1 1 k n ; we see that the monopoly and auction models are equivalent if the number of buyers is su¢ ciently large. In particular, p ; the limit equilibrium price in a single auction with endogenous quantity and a su¢ ciently large number of buyers is given by
Note that an increase of the distribution of the buyers'valuations in the hazard rate order (which implies …rst-order stochastic dominance) yields a higher equilibrium price.
When n is large, the seller's revenue if he sells k objects is R (k; n; a) = kEX n k;n kF 1 n k n = k n k n a The optimal k is k F (n) = 1 a + 1 n and we have k F (n; a) < n=2 if a > 1 and k F (n; a) > n=2 if a < 1: The limit equilibrium price is
Assume now that the seller faces a constant marginal cost of producing one unit, and denote this cost by c 0: The seller's maximization problem is
The marginal revenue from an additional object is given by R(k + 1; n) R(k; n): The following result follows from the observation that the marginal revenue is decreasing in the number of objects if
Proposition 3 If F is IF R, the optimal number of units k F (n; c) decreases in c for …xed n:
Competition among sellers at a unique auction site
We consider now two sellers competing to sell units to n buyers through a single, uniform-price auction.
Sellers 1 and 2 provide k 1 and k 2 objects to the auctioneer, respectively. Then the auctioneer sells (k 1 + k 2 ) through the uniform price auction. Throughout of this section, we assume for simplicity that c = 0: All main results can be immediately extended to the case of positive marginal costs. Moreover, the main result, existence of equilibria of pure strategies generalizes to a setting with several sellers.
is an equilibrium, then for all s 2 f k i ; :::; n k i k j g it must hold:
The following example illustrates several interesting phenomena: 1) Symmetric and asymmetric pure strategy equilibria may coexist; 2) Symmetric pure strategy equilibria may not exist; 12 3) As the number of buyers gets large, all equilibria converge to the symmetric one.
Example 2 Suppose that F is uniform. Given k 2 ; …rm 1 chooses k 1 to maximize
If k 1 is optimal, then for any s = k 1 ; :::; n k 1 k 2
Similarly, if k 2 is optimal for …rm 2; we obtain:
Therefore,
1) If n = 3m there are three possible pure strategy equilibria (see details in the Appendix)
2) If n = 3m + 1; there are also three pure-strategy equilibria
3) If n = 3m + 2; there are only two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
We turn now to a proof of existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Since the strategy spaces are discrete and since the payo¤ functions are not continuous, it is obvious that the standard approach cannot work. Fortunately, it turns out that our game is an ordinal potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Thus it possesses a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, corresponding to a maximizer of the potential function. The next two results hold also for the case where c > 0.
Theorem 1 A pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists in the competition model with one auction site.
By taking a closer look at the potential function, we also get the existence of an "almost"symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium:
De…nition 1 An equilibrium (k 1 ; k 2 ) is quasi-symmetric if jk 1 k 2 j 1:
Theorem 2 A pure strategy, quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists in the competition model with one auction site.
Remark 2 Consider now a large number of buyers. If the sellers supply k 1 and k 2 units, respectively, the revenues are approximated by
This is equivalent to a standard Cournot model where the inverse demand function is given by
In particular, under the conditions of Amir and Lambson(2000), in the limit as n gets large, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
We conclude this Section with the following equilibrium characterization result:
Proposition 4 1) Let F be convex (concave). Then, in any equilibrium, the total supplied quantity is higher (lower) than 2 3 n: In particular, if the distribution of buyers'valuations is uniform, then the total supplied quantity is 2n
, and if n is large, then in any equilibrium, the total supplied quantity is higher (lower) than 2 1+e n: In particular, if the distribution of buyers'values is exponential, the supplied quantity is 2 1+e n units.
Merging auction sites
Schwartz and Ungo (2002) consider a model where two monopolistic auction houses with separate sets of buyers decide to merge, and show that such a merger always increases total revenue (it is obvious that a merger increases total welfare since it yields an overall e¢ cient allocation of the units). In their model, the supplied quantities before the merger are exogenous, and the merged entity simply o¤ers the sum of the ex-ante quantities to the united set of buyers. In other words, the sellers do not optimize their supply, and, moreover, do not adjust it after the merger. In the following example, we look at the case of two separate auction sites, each with one seller. After a merger of the auction sites, the sellers remain separate and compete by optimizing the quantity supplied to the merged site. We show that, unless the number of buyers is small, the post-merger total revenue goes down, which implies that at least one of the sellers loses from the merger. Thus, e¢ ciency gains are per-se, not enough to explain mergers of auction sites if we assume that multiple competing sellers use the merged site and that the site operator earns a …xed fraction of revenue. This conforms to the usual intuition from Cournot analysis, but our results also identi…es the role played in this argument by a large number of buyers.
Example 3 Assume that F is uniform on [0; 1] and assume that, before a merger, the two auction sites face n 1 = n 2 buyers. For the uniform distribution we know that the optimal supply at each site is ni 2 ; i = 1; 2: Thus total pro…t is given by:
After the merger, the unique auction site faces 2n 1 buyers. For the uniform distribution, we know that the equilibrium total supply in the competition model equals 4n1 3 ; two-thirds the number of buyers. Thus, total revenue is
The revenue di¤ erence is
Thus, if n 1 4; total revenue after the merger is lower.
Our next result generalizes the above observation to any distribution, as long as the number of buyers is su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 5 Assume that two separate auction sites, each with one seller and n i = m buyers, merge, and assume that the two sellers subsequently compete in a unique auction with 2m buyers. If m is large enough, total revenue goes down.
Competition among auction sites
We now consider two competing, uniform price, multi-unit auctions. The two sellers simultaneously choose the number of units for sale k i , i = 1; 2 in their respective auctions. The buyers observe the respective supplies at each site, and then decide where to bid, and what bid to place. Since each auction is uniform, the bidding part of the decision is simple, and of no further concern: each bidders places a bid equal to his valuation. Assume then that n 1 buyers compete in auction 1 for k 1 units, while n 2 buyers compete in auction 2 for k 2 units, where k 1 + k 2 < n = n 1 + n 2 :
De…nition 2 A pro…le (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) is an equilibrium of the competing auctions model if :
(i) k i maximizes seller i 0 s revenue given k i: ; n 1 ; n 2 : That is, no seller wishes to adjust supply.
(ii) Given (k 1 ; k 2 ) and given all other buyers' decisions, no buyer h has an incentive to switch to another auction site.
Note that in an equilibrium with positive pro…ts at two auction sites we cannot have k 1 + k 2 = n:
In that case, the supply at one auction site (at least) is no less than the number of buyers , and the respective price is then zero.
The unit price in auction i is given by EX n i k i ;n i : The following Lemma gives a condition on the prices at the two sites that must hold in equilibrium: Lemma 1 Consider any …xed strategy pro…le for the two sellers and for all buyers except h. Then, it is optimal for h to join the auction with the lower expected price. Moreover, in any equilibrium, (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) it must hold that
In other words, in equilibrium, it cannot be pro…table for a buyer in the auction with a higher expected price to move to the other auction. Thus, while equilibrium prices at the two auction sites need not be strictly equal, there are no arbitrage opportunities.
Equilibrium coexistence of two auction sites
Our main result in this section is that two auction sites yielding positive pro…ts for the respective sellers cannot coexist in equilibrium if the distribution of buyers'values is IF R; and if the marginal production cost, c; is su¢ ciently low. The proof is based on the following Lemma which has some independent interest. It shows that, for any pro…le of buyers'actions, at least one of the sellers has an incentive to increase supply if F is IF R:
Lemma 2 1. Consider any con…guration (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) where n 1 ; n 2 > 0; k 1 ; k 2 > 0 and k 1 +k 2 < n;
and assume that buyers play a best response to any announcement of quantities. If EX ni ki;ni EX nj kj ;nj ; i; j = 1; 2; then seller i can attract at least one more buyer by supplying one additional unit.
2. Assume that F is IF R; and that c = 0: For any con…guration (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) where n 1 ; n 2 > 0; k 1 ; k 2 > 0 and k 1 + k 2 < n, one of the sellers can increase his pro…t by supplying one additional unit.
3. If F is IF R; and if c = 0; then R(k; n) = R(k + 1; n + 1) R(k; n), the marginal revenue of seller whose supply increases from k to k + 1 while the number of buyers attending his auction increases from n to n + 1, decreases in k for a …xed n:
The Lemma yields:
Theorem 3 Assume that F is IF R: Then, for su¢ ciently small marginal production costs c; there is no equilibrium in which both sellers are active and make positive pro…ts. In particular, if
there is no symmetric equilibrium with positive pro…ts.
If the IF R condition is not satis…ed, or if the cost is high enough (in contrast to the assumptions of the above Proposition) an equilibrium where two auction sites are active, and where both sellers make positive pro…ts may then exist. We look …rst at an example where F does not satisfy the IF R condition:
Example 4 Let F (x) = x 1=2 ; and let c = 0: Then:
Note that R (k i ; n i ) 0 if k i ni+1 2 : Letting k 1 = k 2 = 2 and n 1 = n 2 = 3; it is clear that no seller has an incentive to increase supply . Assume then that seller 1, say, lowers supply to one unit. Then a buyer attending his auction has an incentive to switch to the other auction since there the price will be EX 2;4 < EX 2;3 : Therefore no seller has an incentive to deviate, and we obtain a symmetric equilibrium in which every seller sells two units and makes a positive pro…t: 13 Next we look at situations where the marginal cost c is su¢ ciently high, Then, sellers do not want to increase their supply above a certain level (since the price drops below cost), and an equilibrium may exist.
If, in a symmetric equilibrium, a seller sells k units, he should have no incentive to increase supply to k + 1. Then, for F which is IF R; we have the necessary condition 14 p = EX n 
where the left inequality indicates that a seller makes a positive pro…t by selling k units to half the number of buyers, and the right inequality indicates that a seller has no incentive to increase the number of supplied units from k to k + 1 if by doing so the number of buyers attending his auction increases from n 2 to n 2 + 1. The following proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for existence of a symmetric equilibrium with the maximal supply value for which both sellers make positive pro…ts.
then the pro…le where each seller sells n 2 1 objects to n 2 buyers constitutes a symmetric equilibrium.
A unique auction site as the outcome of competition
We now focus on equilibria where only one auction site is active, and where only one seller makes a positive pro…t. Roughly speaking, such an equilibrium may exist if the optimal monopolistic quantity for the unique active seller is high enough. Then, the other seller cannot convince enough buyers to switch to his own auction, and thus prefers to stay out.
Formally, an equilibrium with the form (n 1 = n; k 1 > 0; n 2 = 0; k 2 = 0) exists if and only if:
1. 
where e n 2 = e n 2 (k 2 ) is the minimal element in M:
Condition (8) requires that seller 1 optimizes his (monopolistic) supply and makes a positive pro…t,
given that seller 2 is not active. In condition (9), e n 2 is the minimal number of buyers for which selling k 2 units is pro…table for seller 2. Note that if condition (9) holds and if n 2 > e n 2 , we also get EX n2 k2;n2 > EX e n2 k2;e n2 > EX n e n2+1 k 1 ;n e n2+1 = EX n n2+(n2 e n2+1) k 1 ;n n2+(n2 e n2+1)
The …rst inequality follows by repeated application of the known relation EX (i+1;n+1) EX (i;n) ; and the second inequality is condition (9) . That is, condition (9) guarantees that if n 2 > e n 2 buyers attend auction 2, at least (n 2 e n 2 + 1) buyers will want to switch to auction 1. Thus, seller 2 must remain inactive, and earns zero pro…t.
Proposition 7 1. Assume that k 1 = arg max k k(EX n k;n c) is su¢ ciently large (For example, assume that F is su¢ ciently convex and that c is su¢ ciently small). Then there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with a unique active seller.
2. Assume that k 1 = arg max k k(EX n k;n c) < n 2 : (For example, assume that F is su¢ ciently concave) Then there exists no equilibrium with a unique active seller.
The following examples illustrates the result.
Example 5 Let c = 0; n = 4 and let F be uniform on [0; 1]. By Corollary 2 the optimal supply for a monopolistic seller 1 is k 1 = 2. The only alternative for seller 2 that leads to a positive pro…t is to supply one unit. Since EX 1;2 EX 4 1 2;4 1 = EX 1;2 EX 1;3 > 0 , condition (9) is satis…ed. Seller 2 cannot attract more than one buyer to his auction, and he therefore prefers to stay out.
How do the models analyzed in this paper (and in particular the competition models with either one or two auctions sites) compare in terms of equilibrium prices and quantities ? In this section we answer this question under the assumption that the number of buyers is large. We consider the following:
Monopoly (M): one auction site with one seller and n buyers;
Competition among sellers at one auction site (C1): two competing sellers at one auction site with n buyers;
Competing auctions (C2): two sellers running separate auctions, competing to attract n buyers.
For the results below we assume that a symmetric equilibrium exists in this model. Proposition 8 Assume that F; the distribution of buyers' values, is IF R. Assume total equilibrium supply in all three models is at least n 3 + 2: (This happens, for example, if either F is convex enough with respect to the exponential distribution, or if the marginal cost is not too high). Then the following hold:
(1) The equilibrium price under monopoly is higher than the prices in symmetric equilibria of the competition models.
(2) If total supply is higher (lower) than n 2 + 2; then the equilibrium price in the competition model with one auction site is higher (lower) than the equilibrium price in the competition model with two auction sites.
Concluding remarks
We have studied competition among two sellers who optimize their respective supply in markets with a …nite, not necessarily large, number of buyers. We studied a model where all transactions take place at price determined in one auction, and another where there two separate auction sites may operate side by side. A uni…ed perspective on both models can be obtained by considering buyers'switching costs.
Whereas an equilibrium where both sellers make pro…ts always exists in the …rst model (one auction site), this is not the case in the second model (two auction sites) under ubiquitous conditions on the demand function (decreasing marginal revenue) and on the supply functions (su¢ ciently low marginal costs). In markets with sinking production (or trading) costs, our results suggest a movement towards dominant market places featuring several competing suppliers. Ebay is an obvious example. Instead of a competition mode characterized by poaching business from competitors, we currently observe a move towards consolidation also in the trading of securities. 15 For example, on October 17th 2006 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange agreed to buy the Chicago Board of Trade, thus aiming to create the world's biggest …nancial marketplace. 16 Similarly, the Deutsche Börse has long argued for the need of a pan-European exchange, and tried (unsuccessfully) to buy the London Stock Exchange -which is now on NASDAQ's buying list.
Finally, we hope that the mathematical methods used in this paper will prove to be useful in a variety of other competition models with a small number of traders.
7 Appendix A Barlow and Porschan (1966) proved the following 5 results about order statistics:
Lemma 3 Assume that F (0) = 0: If F is convex (concave) then (n + 1) EX i;n =i is decreasing (increasing) in i and increasing (decreasing) in n.
Lemma 4
Let G 1 F be star-shaped on the support of F and assume F (0) = G (0) = 0: Then EX in =EY in is decreasing in i:
and if F (0) = 0; then P r 1 (n i + 1)(X i;n X i 1;n ) is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in n r:
Lemma 6 If F is IFR (DFR) and if F (0) = 0; then (n i + 1) (X i;n X i 1;n ) is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in n i for …xed i:
Lemma 7 If F is IFR (DFR) and if F (0) = 0; then (n i + 1) (X i;n X i 1;n ) is stochastically decreasing (decreasing) in i n for …xed n:
8 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1:
If the distribution of buyers'valuations is F; the seller's revenue when he sells k units is kEX n k;n = (n r) EX r;n where r n k Suppose that r = n k F (n) is optimal: selling k F (n) is always better than selling k 0 > k F (n): Letting r 0 = n k 0 < r ; we obtain (n r ) EX r ;n (n r 0 ) EX r 0 ;n , EX r ;n EX r 0 ;n n r 0 n r
For distribution is G; the seller's revenue when he sells k units is (n k) EY n k;n = (n r) EY r;n where r n k
Suppose that k G (n) units are now optimal. In order to show that k G (n) k F (n); it is su¢ cient to
show that under distribution G; the seller's revenue of selling k F (n) units is always larger than when selling k 0 > k F (n): That is, we need to show that, for r > r 0 (n r ) EY r ;n (n r 0 ) EY r 0 ;n , EY r ;n EY r 0 ;n n r 0 n r Given condition (10) ; it is su¢ cient to show that EY r ;n EY r 0 ;n EX r ;n EX r 0 ;n , EX r ;n EY r ;n EX r 0 ;n EY r 0 ;n By Lemma 4 in Appendix A, EX in =EY in is decreasing in i . Since r > r 0 ; the last inequality holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1:
When n is large, the optimal number of objects k G (n) for the exponential distribution G is k G (n) 2 arg max k kEX n k;n arg max k kG 1 n k n = arg max k ln n k ) k G (n) n e F (0) = G (0) = 0 and G 1 F convex imply together that G 1 F star-shaped. If G is the exponential distribution, G 1 F convex (where …nite) is equivalent to F being IF R. Thus, applying proposition 1, we obtain that k F (n) n=e if F is IF R: The reverse inequality holds for F which is DF R. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2:
If G is uniform distribution, the optimal number of objects k G (n) is k G (n) 2 arg max kEX n k;n = arg max k (n k) n + 1
Applying proposition 1, we obtain that k F (n) ( ) n 2 if F is convex (concave) Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
By Lemma 6 in Appendix A, if F is IF R(DF R); then (n i + 1)(EX i;n EX i 1;n ) is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in n i for …xed i: Thus, if F is IF R we obtain:
(n i + 2)(EX i;n+1 EX i 1;n+1 ) > (n i + 1)(EX i;n EX i 1;n )
This implies that (n i + 1)EX i;n+1 (n i + 2)EX i 1;n+1 + EX i;n+1 > (n i)EX i;n (n i + 1)EX i 1;n + EX i;n Since EX i;n+1 < EX i;n we obtain (n i + 1)EX i;n+1 (n i + 2)EX i 1;n+1 > (n i)EX i;n (n i + 1)EX i 1;n Letting i = n k in the inequality yields (k + 1)EX n+1 (k+1);n+1 (k + 2)EX n+1 (k+2);n+1 > kEX n k+;n (k + 1)EX n (k+1);n Thus, if it is pro…table to decrease the number of objects from k + 1 to k when the number of buyers is n; then it is also pro…table to decrease the number of objects from k + 2 to k + 1 when the number of buyers is n + 1: In particular, k F (n + 1) k F (n) + 1: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
By Lemma 7 in Appendix A, if F is IF R, then (n i + 1)(EX i;n EX i 1;n ) is stochastically decreasing in i n for …xed n: Thus, if F is IF R we obtain:
(n i + 1)(EX i;n EX i 1;n ) > (n (i + 1) + 1)(EX i+1;n EX i;n )
Letting k = n i in the the last inequality yields:
kEX n k;n (k + 1)EX n (k+1);n + EX n k;n > (k 1)EX n (k 1);n kEX n k;n + EX n (k 1);n Since EX n k;n < EX n (k 1);n we obtain kEX n k;n (k 1)EX n (k 1);n > (k + 1)EX n (k+1);n kEX n k;n
The last inequality indicates that the marginal revenue of a seller is decreasing in the number of objects and this property implies the desired result. Q.E.D.
Derivations for Example 2: 1) If n = 3m; where m is an integer, inequality 4 becomes, Suppose k 1 = m; then
Again, there will be three pure-strategy equilibria
3) If n = 3m + 2; where m is an integer, inequality 4 becomes
Therefore, there will be two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
Proof of Theorem 1: Since pro…ts are zero if the produced quantity is larger than the number of bidders, we can assume without loss of generality that the sellers choose quantities out of a …nite set of integers: = f0; 1; 2; :::; Kg ; K < 1: Given k 2 ; seller 1 chooses k 1 2 to maximize the payo¤ function and given k 1 ; seller 2 chooses k 2 2 to maximize the payo¤ function R 2 (k 1 ; k 2 ) = k 2 EX n (k1+k2);n Let denote the above described two-person game, and de…ne P (k 1 ; k 2 ) = k 1 k 2 EX n (k1+k2);n
We now verify that P is an ordinal potential of : 17 We need to check that:
The above conditions become k 1 EX n (k1+k2);n k 0 1 EX n (k 0 1 +k2);n > 0 , k 1 k 2 EX n (k1+k2);n k 0 1 k 2 EX n (k 0 1 +k2);n > 0 k 2 EX n (k1+k2);n k 0 2 EX n (k 0 1 +k2);n > 0 , k 1 k 2 EX n (k1+k2);n k 1 k 0 2 EX n (k 0 1 +k2);n > 0 which trivially hold.
Since both k 1 and k 2 are chosen from a …nite set ; it is obvious that the potential P has a maximum on : (Note that the maximum need not be unique). The existence result follows now directly from the following result:
Lemma 8 (Lemma 2.1, Monderer and Shapley, 1996) Let P be an ordinal potential function for : Then the equilibrium set of (R 1 ; R 2 ) coincides with the equilibrium set of (P; P ) : That is,
is an equilibrium point for if and only if for every i 2 f1; 2g ; P (k i ; k i ) P (k 0 i ; k i ) for every k 0 i 2 :
Consequently, if P admits a maximal value in ; then (R 1 ; R 2 ) possesses a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2: By the above proof, the potential P has a maximum. Suppose that this maximum is achieved at (k 1 ; k 2 ) : We need to show that jk 1 k 2 j 1: Assume, by contradiction, that the opposite holds:
Without loss of generality assume that
Consider now (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) in de…ned by
and observe that k 0 1 + k 0 2 = k 1 + k 2 : We obtain then that P (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ) P (k 1 ; k 2 ) = (k 1 1) (k 2 + 1) EX n (k 1 +k 2 );n k 1 k 2 EX n (k 1 +k 2 );n = (k 1 k 2 1) EX n (k 1 +k 2 );n > 0
where the last inequality follows by (11) . This yields a contradiction to the assumption that P achieves a maximum at (k 1 ; k 2 ) : Thus, jk 1 k 2 j 1 as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
1) Suppose F is convex. Given k 2 ; seller 1 chooses k 1 to maximize
By Corollary 2, if F is convex, k 1 1 2 (n k 2 ) : Analogously, we have k 2 1 2 (n k 1 ) : Combining the two inequalities, it follows that
The opposite inequality holds for concave F:
2) Now suppose F is IF R and n is large. Given k 2 ; seller 1 chooses k 1 to maximize
By Corollary 1, we have k 1 1 e (n k 2 ) : Similarly, we have k 2 1 e (n k 1 ) : Therefore,
The proof for the DF R case is analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that m = n 1 = n 2 is large enough. Total revenue before the merger is
Let k 2 arg max kF 1 m k m :
In the post merger competition the revenues are given by:
We focus on the (quasi) symmetric equilibrium in the post merger games (which always exists by Proposition 2). The potential function is
Since jk c 1 k c 2 j 1, the pro…le (k c 1 ; k c 2 ) that maximizes the potential must satisfy
One implication is that
The change in total revenue is:
Thus, a merger reduces total revenue. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix a strategy pro…le for all agents except buyer h; and assume that in this pro…le the respective quantities and number of bidders at each site are k 1 ; k 2 ; n 1 ; n 2 ; where n 1 + n 2 = n 1: Denote by X the random variable representing bidder h's valuation. If h joins site i; i = 1; 2; his expected payo¤ is given by PrfX EX ni+1 ki;ni+1 gE[X EX ni+1 ki;ni+1 j X EX ni+1 ki;ni+1 ]; i = 1; 2 It is immediate that the above expression is higher for i = arg min fEX n1+1 k1;n1+1 ; EX n2+1 k2;n2+1 g; thus it is optimal for bidder h to join the site with the lower expected price. The second argument follows then immediately by the de…nition of equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
1) Suppose without loss of generality that EX n1 k1;n1 EX n2 k2;n2 . Since EX n1+1 (k1+1);n1+1 = EX n1 k1;n1+1 < EX n1 k1;n1 we obtain EX n1+1 (k1+1);n1+1 < EX n2 k2;n2
The last inequality provides a su¢ cient condition for a buyer to move from auction 2 to auction 1 if seller 1 increases the supplied quantity by one unit while all other agents stay put. The last inequality implies that a seller increases his revenue by attracting one more buyer from the other site.
2)
3) Suppose that the number of buyers in the auction is m: By Lemma 6, if F is IF R(DF R) then (m i + 1)(EX i;m EX i 1;m ) is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in m i for …xed i: Thus,
This implies that
Since EX i;m+1 < EX i;m we obtain The last inequality implies that the marginal revenue of a seller that attracts one more buyer by supplying one more unit is decreasing in k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
As mentioned in the text, if both sellers make a pro…t in equilibrium, we must have k 1 + k 2 < n: Suppose now, by contradiction, that (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) is an equilibrium, where n 1 ; n 2 > 0; n 1 +n 2 = n; k 1 ; k 2 > 0 and k 1 +k 2 < n. Suppose also, without loss of generality, that seller 1 faces the lower expected auction price. Then this seller can increase the number of supplied units to (k 1 + 1) : By Lemma 2, at least one buyer will want to switch to his auction, and, by the assumption on the marginal cost c; this constitutes a pro…table deviation. More buyers switching is even more pro…table since the price further increases. Therefore, (n 1 ; k 1 ; n 2 ; k 2 ) cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 and condition (5) imply that a seller selling k i n 2 1 objects to n 2 bidders has incentive to increase his supply. But, if both sellers together sell n objects, they cannot both make positive pro…ts.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Under condition (7) both sellers have an incentive to increase supply from n 2 2 to n 2 1; but no seller has an incentive to increase supply from n 2 1 to n 2 if by doing so only one more buyer will be attracted. If a seller sells n 2 1 units, at least n 2 1 buyers will attend his auction. Thus, no seller can attract more than one buyer by increasing the number of supplied units beyond n Proof of Proposition 7: 1) Assume that seller 1 sets k 1 = n 1: In that case, at least n 1 = n 1 will always attend auction 1, and the price in auction 1 is at most EX 1;n . Seller 2 has no way of ensuring an equal or lower price.
Thus, no matter what seller 2 does, he cannot attract enough buyers, and entry is not pro…table. Assume next that seller 1 sets k 1 = n 2: Given that at least n 1 = n 2 buyers always attend auction 1, the only way in which seller 2 can make a pro…t is by auctioning one unit to 2 buyers. In that case the price is EX 1;2 : By switching to auction 1, one of these two buyers will face a price of EX 1;n 1 < EX 1;2 : Thus, switching is pro…table, and seller 2 can never make a pro…t by entry.
Continuing in this way, let e k 1 be the minimal k 1 such that for all k 2 < n e k 1 , and for all n 2 ; k 2 < n 2 < n e k 1 ; it holds that EX n2 k2;n2 > EX n n2+1 f k1;n n2+1 > 0
Assume then that k 1 e k 1 ; and assume that selling k 1 is pro…table for seller 1 (condition (8)) .Then, the above inequality implies condition (9) , and thus the existence of an equilibrium with a unique active site.
The assumptions in the statement are satis…ed for su¢ ciently convex F and su¢ ciently small c by Proposition 1.
2) Assume that k 1 < n 2 : Setting k 2 = k 1 ; we obtain:
EX n2 k2;n2 EX n n2+1 k 1 ;n n2+1 = EX n2 k 1 ;n2 EX n n2+1 k 1 ;n n2+1
= EX n2 k 1 ;n2 EX n2 k 1 +(n 2n2+1);n2+(n 2n2+1) < 0
This follows because n 2n 2 + 1 > 0 (k 2 = k 1 implies n 1 = n 2 ) and because EX i;j < EX i+a;j+a for all i < j and a > 0: In particular, condition (9) cannot be satis…ed. Thus, by replicating seller 1's strategy, seller 2 can sustain a positive pro…t, and an asymmetric equilibrium with a unique active seller does not exist.
The assumption k 1 < n 2 is clearly satis…ed if F is su¢ ciently concave -see Proposition 1 and Corollary 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Assume that total supply in monopoly is 2k units. Denote by g(x) = (F 1 ) 0 (x): Then, the marginal revenue obtained by supplying an additional unit is given by:
M R M (k) = (2k + 1)EX n (2k+1);n 2kEX n 2k;n = EX n (2k+1);n 2k EX n 2k;n EX n (2k+1);n F 1 n 2k 1 n + 1 2k F 1 n 2k n + 1 F 1 n 2k 1 n + 1 For the competition model with one auction site and total supply of 2k; the marginal revenue of a seller is:
M R C1 (k) = (k + 1)EX n (2k+1);n kEX n 2k;n = EX n (2k+1);n k EX n 2k;n EX n (2k+1);n F 1 n 2k 1 n + 1 k F 1 n 2k n + 1 F 1 n 2k 1 n + 1 On the other hand, note that (n 2k) n 2 + 2 > 1 , k < n 4 + 1:
Thus, we have: If the distribution F has an increasing hazard rate, then by Lemma 2, the marginal revenue M R C2 (k)
is decreasing in k. Note also that M R M (k) = EX i;n (n i + 1) (EX i;n EX i 1;n ) where i = n 2k M R C1 (k) = 1 2 EX i;n + 1 2 EX i 1;n 1 2 (n i + 1) (EX i;n EX i 1;n ) where i = n 2k By Lemma 7, both M R M (k) and M R C1 (k) are decreasing in k if F is IF R.
Since the marginal cost is assumed to be the same across models, the equilibrium quantity is lowest and the price is the highest under monopoly. If marginal cost is relatively low, and assuming that an equilibrium exists in the competition model with two sites, this situation is more competitive than the one with one site. The opposite occurs for high marginal cost. Q.E.D.
When deriving the marginal revenue in the competition model with two auction sites, we assumed that the additional number of bidders that a seller can attract by increasing supply by one unit is one.
The following lemma gives a mild condition under which this is indeed the case: It will be satis…ed as long as c is not too large, such that the equilibrium supply of each seller satis…es k > n 6 + 1: Analogous, weaker conditions can be derived whenever the number of attracted bidders is …nite and small relative to the equilibrium quantity k: 
Then, if a seller increases (decrease) supply by one unit, he attracts (looses) exactly one buyer;
Proof of Lemma 9: By the necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium (6) , and condition (12) , we obtain that k > n 6 + 1 where k denotes the equilibrium supply of each seller (otherwise, a seller always has incentive to increase quantity by one).
1) Suppose …rst that seller 1 increases supply by one unit. Lemma 2 shows that he can attract at least one more bidder. Therefore, we only need to show that he cannot attract two more bidders. That is, we need to show that 2) Suppose seller 1 decreases his supply by one. We show …rst that he will lose at least one bidder, and then we show that he will not lose more than one bidder.
(i) In order to show seller 1 will lose at least one bidder, it is su¢ cient to show EX n 2 (k 1); n 2 > EX n 2 +1 k ; n 2 +1 which holds trivially.
(ii) In order show seller 1 will not lose more than one bidder, it is su¢ cient to show EX ( n 2 1) (k 1); n 2 1 < EX n 2 +2 k ; n 2 +2 :
For large n; this is equivalent to Q.E.D.
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